## Our Time in a Product Review Cabal

And the **malware** and **bugs** that came with it

Adam Schaal @clevernyyyy

Matt Virus @themattvirus





## **Humans-in-the-loop**



#### **Adam Schaal**



HARDWARE SKILLS

SOFTWARE SKILLS



#### **Matt Virus**



HARDWARE SKILLS

SOFTWARE SKILLS

- Head of AWS SHINE
- Homelab Enthusiast
- Community Involvement
  - Kernelcon Board Member and Founder
  - DEF CON 402 Board Member
  - Loco Moco Sec Organizer
  - O.MG Cable Alumni

- IoT engineer at Cisco (17+ years)
- Part-time farmer
- Hardware junkie
- Former DoD (US) forensics and malware analyst
- Founder of hackspace.io
- Kernelcon Hardware Hacking Chair

## **Boilerplate Disclaimer**


- All of this work was done for research purposes only.
- Nothing we discuss today is representative of our employer's views, opinions, or research.



- We ensured that every review, photo, and video were immediately taken down and reported.
- Platform agnostic. This affects all online retailers, not particular platforms.
- We strive to be an ethical cabal.
- Lastly, we're definitely here for the security and community despite what our slides may look like.



## **Today's Brewing Process**



01	Milling & Mashing	How we got started and how we formed the cabal
02	Boiling	Scaling our cabal and noticing odd patterns
03	Cooling & Fermentation	Deep dive into some of our free products

04	Centrifuge	Scaling our work with Al
05	Carbonation	Cautionary tales
06	Bright Tank	How to purchase online safely
07	Bottling	Wrap up, Santé!





# Milling & Mashing

How'd we end up with a closet full of gear?

2020 COVID-19 Pandemic

We're not just here for the beer.



Masks



**Streaming Media** 




**Online Shopping** 




## Our journey started with a postcard...









# 4 Profit!














## But what if we wanted two?



#### We needed to think like a hacker...

- What if we interacted from different email addresses?
- Would they notice?



## But what if we wanted two?



They did not!

#### We needed to think like a hacker...

- What if we interacted from different email addresses?
- Would they notice?



## It scaled...









## And scaled...















## And scaled...




















## And scaled...











## Jealous Friends



Friends were jealous of our cool loot...

#### SO WE SHARED!

By referring people to vendors, they suddenly starting receiving their own invites.

Some were official referrals, but with others, we just started modifying forwarded email body/headers/etc and replied directly.

## We Soon Realized...


No one cared who responded.


Not only that, but they didn't seem to know who they sent the original messages to.

That means we could pass invites around.



## Forming the Cabal





## Whoa that really escalated

Inbo	Fwd: Free!!!!We invite you test new products-Webcam&Dual Band Wi-Fi Router&Wireless Video Doorbell&Dual Band Wi-Fi Router&Table Lamp - com/victure-sc30/p/18K-075Y-00006?ltem=9SIB3WTF		11/15/21
Inbo	Fwd: Victure VIP New camera Limited Supply Free Trial - Victure VIP. I'm interested. Adam > > From: William Xu > Date: Mon, Jun 7, 2021, 11:53 AM > Subject: Victure	0	6/8/21
Inbox	Fwd: Hi friends, cover full pp fees , we need US US reviewer, need 5 star review , massage gun, baby monitor, dash cam and blood pressure monitors worth 300 USD !!	0	5/11/21
Inbo	Free WIFI Dash Cam for Yout (Only US) - Susie from Victure. So sorry for disturbing you and thank you very much for your reading this email. My colleague told me that	0	3/3/21
Inbo	Fwd: cnschaal@gmail.com - Lily from Victure Are you interested in reviewing our products with a 100% full refund? If yes, you could join our promotion	0	2/1/21
Inbo	Fwd: Warm Greetings from Victure((Only US) - From: Victure Support Date: Tue, Dec 22, 2020, 9:51 PM Subject: Warm Greetings from Victure((Only US) To: Dear Customer	0	12/23/20
Inbox	Fwd: Warm Greetings from Victure!(Only US) - From: Victure Support Date: Tue, Dec 22, 2020, 9:48 PM Subject: Warm Greetings from Victure!(Only US) To: Dear Customer	0	12/23/20
Inbox	Fwd: cnschaal@gmail.com - with our Victure products! 💃 👺 🚵 Are you interested in reviewing our products with a 100% full refund? If yes, you could join	•	12/18/20
Inbox	Fwd: \$ 120 Smart Lock Test Review Invitation from Victure(USA) - Invitation from Victure(USA) - Invitation from Victure(USA) To: cnschaal Hi Friend, This is Lucy from the official Victure Service Team. As you browsing		11/9/20
Inbo	Fwd: 4PCS Outdoor WiFi Secuirty Camera System for test! Worth \$190! Forwarded message From: 752685779 <752685779 @qq.com> Date: Wed, Oct 14,	0	10/16/20
Inbo	Greetings! Refund from Victure! - Susie from Victure Support Team. Many thanks for your precious time to read this letter. Could you please tell us if you remember		9/17/20
Inbo	Fwd: Kids camera need test - com/Victure -Rechargeable-Shockproof-Camcorder-Christmas/dp/B0822R3WF6/ref=sr_1_35?dchild=1&keywords	0	9/9/20
Inbo	Fwd: Be the First One to Test Our New Product - Victoria from Victure. How is your day going? >>>> I have good news for you! Our company launches some new	0	8/29/20
Inbo	Fwd: Free Webcam for You - keyword: victure webcam (page 1 to 2 to search, >>> \$59.99) Please note to use this keyword not others to search	0	8/17/20
Inbo	Fwd: (Only US)Testing expensive camera and infrared Thermometer - That is so great, my friend, and may i ask do you have any friend need this?! just need many reviews,	0	8/16/20
Inbo	A Chance to Win Router - Victoria from Victure. How is your day going? I have good news for you! Our company launches some new products and I want to		8/12/20
Inbo	A Chance to Win Router - Victoria from Victure. How is your day going? I have good news for you! Our company launches some new products and I want to		8/12/20
Inbo	Fwd: A Chance to Win Router - Victoria from Victure. Our company launches some new products and I would like to tell you that we have machines for giving	0	8/3/20
Inbox	Fwd: the step to find the product - YES, you can cancel the order, because the camera now no need a test at present I will have a good	0	8/2/20
Inbox	Fwd: A Chance to Win Router - Victoria from Victure. Our company launches some new products and I would like to tell you that we have machines for giving		7/31/20
Inbo	Refund from Victure - it's just Victure reviews. Adam On Wed, Jul 29, 2020 at 12:26 PM giveaways wrote: > Dear Customer, > > Have you		7/31/20
Inbox	Fwd: A special invitation for you! - From: victure Jessica Date: Sat, Jul 25, 2020, 7:46 AM Subject: A special invitation for you! To: Dear friend, Wish you all	0	7/25/20
Inbox	Fwd: Free Webcam for You: ^ Lingling from Victure.* So sorry for disturbing you and thank you very much for your reading this email. *My colleague told	0	7/24/20
Inbox	Fwd: a special activity for our loyal customer - 26 PM victure Jessica > wrote: >>> Great, thanks! >>> Adam Schaal 于2020年5月20日周三 上午11:13写道	0	5/26/20
Inbox	Fwd: Spend 2 minutes to get a Vitcure wifi camera/baby monitor PM Jolin Victure > wrote:>>> Have a nice day >> >> Adam S 于2020年5月13日周三上午11:15写道: >> >	0	5/18/20

## Whoa that really escalated




## Whoa that really escalated



## But what about the stuff?











Choose your meme adventure, this stuff is suspicious.





# 03

# Cooling & Fermenting

Deep dive in product hardware and software



# Adam and Matt's Deep Dive Pub



The Three T's



Camera Software



Camera Hardware



Mesh Routers



## Tekin, Treatlife, Tuya

#### Treatlife & Tekin products use Tuya IoT Platform → Evil

- Plain text, phone #, SSID, device stats, floorplans!
- Device MFG can push silent firmware upgrade at will (of their own compiling, etc)


#### First wave of devices: ESP8266 processors. Yay!

Massive Vulnerability Tuya Convert exploit!

Eventually, this became a patched vulnerability, changed key derivation method.

#### **Michael Steigerwald sources:**

- https://media.ccc.de/v/35c3-9723-smart\_home\_-\_smart\_hack
- https://github.com/ct-Open-Source/tuya-convert





## Tekin, Treatlife, Tuya

## More devices collected, different processors → Same FCC Docs?!?

- Beken-based hardware (WB2S, WP8B, etc)
- Same pinout, but not ESP compatible → Sad
- Still using Tuya platform → Evil

## Pin compatible with ESP32-C3 (and ESP8266-12F)

Hot air station chip swaps!





## Tekin, Treatlife, Tuya

#### **Tuya CloudCutter: Khaled Nassar (et al)**

- https://rb9.nl/posts/2022-03-29-light-jailbreaking-exploiting-tuya-iot-devices/
- New local keys written same keys multiple devices
- Device severed from cloud: new keys, no Tuya cloud interaction

#### **New Bekin-compatible firmware!**


- https://github.com/kuba2k2/libretiny
- https://github.com/openshwprojects/OpenBK7231T\_App
- https://tasmota.github.io/docs/
- Open-source firmware → **Goodness**

#### **Easily flashed using UART flashing tools!**







- Router configuration <u>requires</u> a phone to set up, they <u>do not</u>
   have a web interface for the router.
- Nmap shows the following open ports:
  - 5500 (Universal Plug and Play)
  - 9000 (App Interface)
  - 12598 (Used for auto configuring the wifi repeaters)
- The app uses cleartext tcp communication over port 9000 to retrieve serial number and configure the device.
- The serial number is the <u>unchangeable password!</u>



- The Android app reaches out to a few places as well... let's investigate.
  - The router, I suppose that makes sense.
  - Also, Facebook!? Why!?
  - And lastly, 116.211.155.199:80...
    - Hmm, I wonder what that is?



- The Android app reaches out to a few places as well... let's investigate.
  - The router, I suppose that makes sense.
  - Also, Facebook!? Why!?
  - And lastly, 116.211.155.199:80...
    - Hmm, I wonder what that is?
    - CHINA



- APK investigation
- /cgi-bin/luci/admin/datamanager
- Possible tenda backdoor



## Tenda AC15 AC1900 Vulnerabilities Discovered and Exploited

Demonstrating how remote attackers can gain control of the Tenda AC15 AC1900.



### Cameras

#### Several cameras collected (Victure, Voger, Escam, others)


#### **Default/stock software notsogood**

- Required "interesting" apps to setup
- Long boot time, errors in boot process
- Several on Tuya platform

## Moving IP space globally (China -> AWS USA) Some NOT on Tuya (Escam)

- Interesting P2P connectivity
- Recommended: Paul Marrapese <a href="https://youtu.be/Z\_gKEF76oMM">https://youtu.be/Z\_gKEF76oMM</a>
- P2P connections -> huge exposure, unauthenticated access
- P2P connectivity enabled by default when using "PS6Lite App" setup
- Escam setup app: PS6 Lite App references of "local mode"....gone?
- Camera broadcasts network for "base setup"...
- Connect -> DHCP allocated to client -> examine gateway config......
- Connect directly to undocumented webif on camera, no app necessary!

mkdir: can't create directory '/usr/local/pureftpd': File exists
[UDTMediaServer/CUDTMediaServer.cpp]BUILD:Jan 8 2020 16:53:25
[UDTMediaServer/Alexa/CAlexaServer.cpp]BUILD:Jan 8 2020 16:54:02
[UDTMediaServer/MstarAECVerify/CMstarAECVerify.cpp]BUILD:Jan 8 2020 16:53:57
mkdir: can't create directory '/usr/local/pureftpd/etc': File exists
creatSystemUser
Changing password for ftpuser1
New password:
Retype password:
Passwords don't match
password for ftpuser1 is unchanged







### **Cameras**

#### Every camera tried to connect out. Some a LOT. Some interesting IP's:

- 119.23.131.xxx (China)
- 120.79.44.0/23 (China)
- 150.136.193.181 Oracle?
- Lots of cloud connections from some cameras

#### Cameras worked with varying success using RTSP/ONVIF

ESCAM+Foscam best...but still issues

#### Notable CVE: Live 555 Media Server

- Version .77 running on Foscam camera
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-7314
- https://github.com/r3dxpl0it/RTSPServer-Code-Execution-Vulnerability

#### Work-arounds?

- DHCP reservation without gateway, layer3 ACL, etc.
- UART/JTAG available on most/all cameras (with some digging)
- Open Firmware <a href="https://github.com/OpenIPC/">https://github.com/cjj25/Yi-RTS3903N-RTSPServer</a>

LIVE555 Media Server
version 0.77 (LIVE555 Streaming Media library version 2014.02.10).
Play streams from this server using the URL
rtsp://0.0.0.0:65534/<filename>

## Live Networks LIVE555 streaming media RTSPServer lookForHeader code execution vulnerability

CVE-2018-4013

#### Summary

An exploitable code execution vulnerability exists in the HTTP packet-parsing functionality of the LIVE555 RTSP server library. A specially crafted packet can cause a stack-based buffer overflow, resulting in code execution. An attacker can send a packet to trigger this vulnerability.

### **Cameras**

test

tftp

showvar - print local hushshell variables size - determine a file's size sleep - delay execution for some time source - run script from memory

- minimal test like /bin/sh

true - do nothing, successfully ugzip - Compress gzipfile with hardware IP


unzip - unzip a memory region

sysboot - command to get and boot from syslinux files

tftpboot- boot image via network using TFTP protocol tftpput - TFTP put command, for uploading files to a server

- boot image via network using TFTP protocol

```
version - print monitor, compiler and linker version
OpenIPC # version
U-Boot 2016.11-q6d2ed0c-dirty (Mar 20 2023 - 13:54:51 +0300)hi3518ev300
arm-himix100-linux-qcc (HC&C V100R002C00B032 20190114) 6.3.0
GNU ld (GNU Binutils) 2.29
OpenIPC #
openipc-hi3518ev300 login: root
Password:
  .d88888b.
                                     8888888 8888888b. .d88888b.
  d88P" "Y88b
                                                 Y88b d88P Y88b
                                                  888 888
        888 88888b. .d88b. 88888b.
                                                 d88P 888
        888 888 "88b d8P Y8b 888 "88b 888
                                            8888888P" 888
        888 888 888 8888888 888 888
  Y88b. .d88P 888 d88P Y8b. 888 888 888 888
                                                      Y88b d88P
  "Y88888P" 88888P" "Y8888 888 888 8888888 888
                                                       "Y8888P"
                                     master+688aaaa, 2024-10-10
 Please help the OpenIPC Project to cover the cost of development and
 long-term maintenance of what we believe is going to become a stable,
 flexible Open IP Network Camera Framework for users worldwide.
 Your contributions could help us to advance the development and keep
 you updated on improvements and new features more regularly.
 Please visit https://openipc.org/sponsor/ to learn more. Thank you.
```



```
System startup
Uncompress Ok!
U-Boot 2016.11-svn8496 (Aug 24 2019 - 18:00:33 +0800)hi3518ev300
Relocation Offset is: 03751000
Relocating to 43f51000, new gd at 43f10ef0, sp at 43f10ed0
SPI Nor: NAND: 0 MiB
MMC: Card did not respond to voltage select!
No SD device found !
hisi-sdhci: 0
      serial
Out: serial
Err: serial
Net: No ethernet found.
*No SD card found!
Hit Ctrl+C key to stop autoboot: 0
hisilicon #
hisilicon #
hisilicon #
```








## Centrifuge

Scaling our research with GenAl and LLMs


## Camera Research







## Camera Research







## Camera Research





## Camera Research

ChatGPT 5 V

if i upload a BIN file that consists of firmware from a sur camera, can you extract it with binwalk and tell me abou addresses/domains it calls out to or any other interestin the filesystem. Also interested in any hard-coded usern passwords

#### Thought for 19s

Absolutely—upload the BIN and I'll statically triage it for you. Here's what I can do right he once the file is attached:

#### What I'll extract & report

- · Any embedded URLs, domains, and IPv4/IPv6 addresses.
- · Likely C2 / telemetry endpoints (HTTP(S), MQTT, NTP, DNS-over-HTTPS, etc.).
- Hard-coded usernames/password hints from files like /etc/passwd , /etc/shadow (has init scripts, and config files.
- Interesting scripts/binaries (startup scripts, update agents, watchdogs), embedded cert suspicious strings.
- · Indicators of known filesystems (SquashFS, CramFS, UBIFS, JFFS2) and partition header

#### How I'll do it here (no outside tools required)

- · Run a deep strings pass and regex-scan for:
  - Domains / URLs: ([a-z0-9-]+\.)+[a-z]{2,} and https?://...
  - IPv4 / IPv6

### What I extracted & analyzed just now

- Top SquashFS candidates (3) + Top JFFS2 candidates (5) were scanned deeply for:
  - passwd/shadow-style lines, credential tokens
  - JSON/INI/XML-ish config snippets
  - domains/IPv4/URLs/emails
  - service hints (onvif/rtsp/p2p/cloud/boa/lighttpd/goahead/etc.)
  - common file paths (/etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, boa.conf, wpa supplicant.conf, etc.)

### Fresh results (over the carved FS blobs)

- Credential artifacts (sample) found in SquashFS blobs:
  - root:x:0:0:root:/:/bin/sh
  - root:\$1\$6AHjBnTn\$LvoexcPTiWwZP5fLfCGdv1:0:0:99999:7::: ← MD5-crypt hash (salt 6AHjBnTn)
- · Features confirmed from libs/strings inside FS data:
  - ONVIF (libXSDK Onvif.so)
  - RTSP (libXSDK Rtsp.so, "nRtspPort")
  - P2P ( libXSDK\_P2P.so , "P2P\_Server" , "stP2PList" , "enP2PType" )
  - Cloud (libXSDK\_cloud.so, "CLOUD\_Server", "DevCloudId", "OsscloudSetting", "bCloudRecord", "bCloudSnapshoot")
  - Interoperability hooks: libXSDK Hik.so , "nHikPort"
  - Boot/Recovery strings: plentiful TFTP strings suggesting loader/recovery behaviors
- Indicators from FS scans: high domain count (likely noisy from data blocks), very few clean URLs. Use
  the CSV below for triage.

## **Interesting Findings**

- Credential artifacts (heuristic):
  - Found entries resembling /etc/passwd & /etc/shadow style lines, including a root shadow hash:
    - root:x:0:0:root:/:/bin/sh
    - root:\$1\$6AHjBnTn\$LvoexcPTiWwZP5fLfCGdv1:0:0:99999:7::: ← MD5-crypt (\$1\$...) with salt
       6AHjBnTn
  - These may be in a carved filesystem blob; I've included the exact lines in the report so you (or hashcat/john) can attempt offline cracking if desired.



## Introducing the "Kernel"



### HARDWARE HACKING VILLAGE

PROJECTS ARE FREE TO DO, SMALL FEE TO TAKE HOME.

(FEE COVERS HARDWARE & SUPPLY COSTS ONLY)

- BADGE ACTIVITIES (FREE!)
- DEEPSEEK DECODER: ON-PREMISE AI (FREE!)
- T-MOBILE TEST DRIVE HOTSPOT HACK (\$20)
- INDOOR OR OUTDOOR SMART PLUG FIRMWARE FLASH (\$10)
- · DIY LIGHT STRIP WITH WLED FIRMWARE (\$15)
- WIRELESS AP FIRMWARE FLASH: MERAKI -->
   OPENWRT (\$15)
- · MESHTASTIC NODE: BUILD+FLASH (\$50)
- CRYPTOMINING VILLAGE (FREE!)

GUIDES AND NOTES AT: WWW.HACKSPACE.IO/PROJECTS




QUESTIONS? PROBLEMS?

YELL FOR A VOLUNTEER FOR ASSISTANCE, WE ARE
HAPPY TO HELD!



## Obviously...




We have to throw our \$16 camera firmware at our \$200,000 server.



## The "Kernel"






"A high-end, powerful machine, purpose built for AI analysis"



## Hashcat running on The Kernel



### Success

password is yunyi666



### yunyi: Mandarin

- cloud
- free as a cloud
- elegant [brand]




**Victure NX200-TX** 

## Other DeepSeek Interesting Findings

squasilis_squasilis_bitoovuoa/pouropaooleoatoelubco40b0ezcic/ouococzzua0ooacep4u0ic/z	uomam	5.5u	
squashfs_squashfs_b1380d8a795d739a63fe8a13efdbc840b0e2c1c78d0c8c22da086ace94d01c72	domain	sn.bin	
squashfs_squashfs_b1380d8a795d739a63fe8a13efdbc840b0e2c1c78d0c8c22da086ace94d01c72	domain	sts.dvr163.com	
squashfs_squashfs_b1380d8a795d739a63fe8a13efdbc840b0e2c1c78d0c8c22da086ace94d01c72	domain	syscaps.json	1/5

domain	carved_xz_00_decompressed	your.3322.org
domain	carved_xz_00_decompressed	members.3322.org
email	carved_xz_00_decompressed	ctnet@mycdma.cn







## Carbonation



## **Cautionary Tale: Bed Bug**

2x strange SSID showed up seemingly randomly.

- WMB07FAC WMB07E58
- Investigated (lightly) over ~1.5 years, with no results.
- Connecting yielded no details, port 80 open.
- DHCP running, address handed out.
- Enter DOPESCOPE!







## **Cautionary Tale: Bed Bug**

### **Offending Hardware**

Adjustable bed base unit.

### **Interesting Detail**

- Previously investigated, identified hardware on bed base did not align with wifi hardware in manual. Also, did not order wifi adjustable base, verified through purchase order.
- But... the bed is indeed adjustable via wifi!




### **LESSON LEARNED**

Even valid/trusted/clandestine hardware can be odd and behave in unexpected ways.

## **Cautionary Tale: Oh Baby**

- Rogue SSID on network as a random string of characters and numbers.
- Unauthenticated access, didn't appear to do anything, nor did it have standard ports.
- I had only plugged in so many things, so I was able to figure it out.
- Solution: return all, buy a model that specifically said it didn't use wifi and verify the products claims.





### LESSON LEARNED

Do not add hardware to your setup, without vetting it and ensuring it performs correctly.





## **Bright Tank**

Now, how do you purchase online safely?

## White Labels




Most of these brands are **white labels**, which means they relabel their product when their storefront gets shutdown or they need a brand refresh.

- Oftentimes the firmware may differ slightly, but the hardware is exactly the same and has the same flaws and vulnerabilities.
- NOTE White label hardware is typically supplied by Tuya.



## **Lessons Learned**




### Pay Attention


If something is too good to be true, it probably is.



### **Exercise Caution**

Always test untrusted hardware in a safe environment, before putting in home ops.






### **Be Skeptical**

Be wary of online reviews. Approach with skepticism, not all of them are legitimate.

## **How to spot Fake Reviews**



★★★★★ Excellent dimmer -highly functional December 7, 2019

**Verified Purchase** 

The TM Innovation digital Bluetooth thermometer is dependable it is a great value. Excellent value for daily use. It delivers reliable temperature measurements with ease. This is the best thermometer I have ever used, i really like it a lot! It is a great addition to any healthcare kit.



Generic: "very good" but no detail

Overly enthusiastic!

Sometimes not related to product at all!



# 07

## Bottling

What's next, wrap up, Santé!



## **Moving to Facebook Groups**



Kaiy <154291309@qq.com>

to me

Hi

Thanks for your quick reply.

Sorry, due to the upcoming promotional festival, we are currently in short supply, so the test quota has been reduced.

If you have Facebook, please join our test group, we will post more free quality products in it later.

Facebook group:

https://www.facebook.com/groups/kaiyfriend/

Thanks again, and look forward to cooperating with you in the future.

Have a nice day!

Best regards,

Kaiy

- 原始邮件 ----

发件人: "Adam Schaal" <aschaal1263@gmail.com>;

发送时间: 2021年4月29日(星期四) 上午6:52 收件人: "Kaiy"<154291309@gq.com>;

主题: Re: Computer Tablet Test Invitation



Thu, Jul 15, 2021, 8:43 PM 💠

Hello friend

Thank you for your reply ,i am to be happy

The steps to test this product are:

1, Search keyword: Robot Vacuum and find our product. It's on page 4-5, thank you for your patience, it will take you a little time.

This picture is the main picture of our product, priced at \$212.49 with \$30 coupon.(please use the coupon)



- 2. After you find the product, please check the detail page and add it to your shopping cart, and help me ask 5 questions about my product on Amazon, all these actions are for your account security.
- 3. Please place the order directly, after you finish the order, please send me your order screenshot + order number, and also send your PayPal email.
- 4. After you receive the goods, and please review with some pictures or video on Amazon please contact me and I will return the full amount for you.(include 100% pp fee no tax)

Are you willing to accept such a step?

Meanwhile, I very sincerely invite you to join our official FB group. https://www.facebook.com/groups

Any assertione wa're all int



## Some Vendors Are Doing It Right




- Offers a "research fee" for purchasing their camera and reviewing.
- Never asked for an online review, just asked for replies to a product research email.
- Product cost \$80, research fee was \$140.
- Still able to pass this around to the cabal.





## **Global Problem**



These products have become common; they're cheap and highly ranked on marketplaces.

The people who suffer the most are local shop owners or public services.

In fact, we've been to a few of those types of places on this trip.




## **Example: Tapo in Coffee Shop in Paris**





## **Example: TP-Link Plug in MOCA**

(Paris)






## **Example: NK Bodega in Paris.**





## **Example: Hikvision in Ghent.**





## This is how you end up on Shodan





## **Our Long-Term Goal - Accessibility**

This project will culminate with our long-term goal of making firmware analysis more accessible.

The barrier-of-entry for analyzing firmware for bugs, vulnerabilities, and general shittiness is **too high**.



## Step 1: Making this Reusable (locally)

```
🕏 fw analysis.py
     fw_analysis.py
     Expanded firmware analysis helper:
     - Carves candidate blobs from BIN images (SquashFS, XZ, LZMA, gzip, JFFS2 markers)
     - Attempts nested decompression (gzip, xz, lzma) in-Python (safe caps)
     - If `unsquashfs` is available, unsquashes SquashFS blobs into `unsquashed/`
     - Recursively scans carved blobs and extracted filesystem trees for IOCs and suspicious artifacts:
         * domains, IPv4s, URLs, emails
         * /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow-like lines
         * init.d references, service config paths
         * PEM/private key beginnings
         * telnet/ssh/dropbear mentions and updater/p2p/cloud keywords
     - Writes outputs:
         OUT_DIR/
           carved/
           extracted/
                               (nested decompressed artifacts)
           unsquashed/
                               (if unsquashfs succeeds)
                               (CSV lists)
           REPORT. md
     Usage:
         python3 firmware finder extended.py -i firmware.bin -o analysis out
     Requirements:
          - Python 3.8+ (3.10 recommended)
          - Optional: unsquashfs (squashfs-tools) on PATH to expand SquashFS blobs
```

We don't want this to be a one-time scan that we created.

So, it's been moved to GitHub. This is a scrappy version made by DeepSeek and us with love.



https://github.com/mattvirus/fw\_analysis

## Step 2: Expanding our Coverage

Keep your eyes on our GitHub and social media profiles as we work on what's next.

### A little preview...

- Firmware Analysis and Inspection
   MCP Server
- Potentially opening sovereign
   DeepSeek scanning to our
   community.





## **Thank You**

**Any Questions?** 

**Adam Schaal** @clevernyyyy

**Matt Virus** @themattvirus @hackspaceio









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